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Abstract—We consider an adversarial Bayesian signal process-
ing problem involving “us” and an “adversary”. The adversary
observes our state in noise; updates its posterior distribution of
the state and then chooses an action based on this posterior. Given
knowledge of “our” state and sequence of adversary’s actions
observed in noise, we consider three problems: (i) How can the
adversary’s posterior distribution be estimated? Estimating the
posterior is an inverse filtering problem involving a random
measure - we formulate and solve several versions of this
problem in a Bayesian setting. (ii) How can the adversary’s
observation likelihood be estimated? This tells us how accurate
the adversary’s sensors are. We compute the maximum likelihood
estimator for the adversary’s observation likelihood given our
measurements of the adversary’s actions where the adversary’s
actions are in response to estimating our state. (iii) How can
the state be chosen by us to minimize the covariance of the
estimate of the adversary’s observation likelihood? “Our” state
can be viewed as a probe signal which causes the adversary
to act; so choosing the optimal state sequence is an input
design problem. The above questions are motivated by the
design of counter-autonomous systems: given measurements of
the actions of a sophisticated autonomous adversary, how can
our counter-autonomous system estimate the underlying belief of
the adversary, predict future actions and therefore guard against
these actions.
Index Terms—inverse filtering, adversarial signal processing,
remote calibration, maximum likelihood, counter-autonomous
systems, random measure, optimal probing, stochastic dominance
I. INTRODUCTION
BAYESIAN filtering maps a sequence of noisy obser-vations to a sequence of posterior distributions of the
underlying state. This paper considers the inverse problem of
reconstructing the posterior given the state and noisy measure-
ments of the posterior; and also estimating the observation
likelihood parameter and designing the state signal. That is
we wish to construct an optimal filter to estimate the ad-
versary’s optimal filtered estimate, given noisy measurements
of the adversary’s action. Such problems arise in adversarial
signal processing applications involving counter-autonomous
systems: the adversary has a sophisticated autonomous sensing
system; given measurements of the adversary’s actions we
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wish to estimate the adversary’s sensor’s capabilities and
predict its future actions (and therefore guard against these
actions).
A. Problem Formulation
The problem formulation involves two players; we refer to
the two players as “us” and “adversary”. With k = 1, 2, . . .
denoting discrete time, the model has the following dynamics:
xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0
yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk)
pik = T (pik−1, yk)
ak ∼ Gpik,a = p(a|pik)
(1)
Let us explain the notation in (1): p(·) denotes a generic
conditional probability density function (or probability mass
function), ∼ denotes distributed according to, and
• xk ∈ X is our Markovian state with transition kernel
Pxk−1,x and prior pi0 where X denotes the state space.
• yk ∈ Y is the adversary’s noisy observation of our state
xk; with observation likelihoods Bxy . Here Y denote the
observation space.
• pik = p(xk|y1:k) is the adversary’s belief (posterior) of
our state xk where y1:k denotes the sequence y1, . . . , yk.
The operator T in (1) is the classical Bayesian filter [1]
T (pi, y) =
Bx,y
∫
X Pζ,x pi(ζ) dζ∫
X Bx,y
∫
X Pζ,x pi(ζ) dζdx
(2)
Let Π denote the space of all such beliefs. When the
state space X is Euclidean space, then Π is a function
space comprising the space of density functions; if X is
finite, then Π is the unit X − 1 dimensional simplex of
X-dimensional probability mass functions.
• ak ∈ A denotes our measurement of the adversary’s
action based on its current belief1 pik where A denotes
the action space. Thus G is the conditional probability
(or density if A is continuum) of observing an action a
given the adversary’s belief pi.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the model (1). The
shaded nodes are known to us, while the white nodes are
computed by the adversary and unknown to us. This is in
contrast to classical Bayesian filtering where yk is known to
us and xk is to be estimated, i.e, pik is to be computed.
1More explicitly, the adversary chooses an action uk as a deterministic
function of pik and we observe uk in noise as ak . We encode this as Gpik,ak .
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of inverse filtering problem. The shaded
nodes are known to us, while the white nodes are unknown. The model is
described in (1).
B. Objectives
Given (1), this paper considers the following problems:
1) Inverse Filtering: How to estimate the adversary’s belief
given measurements of its actions (which are based on
its filtered estimate of our state)? Assuming probability
distributions P,B,G are known, estimate the adversary’s
belief pik at each time k, by computing posterior p(pik |
pi0, x0:k, a1:k). From a practical point of view, estimating
the adversary’s belief allows us to predict (in a Bayesian
sense) future actions of the adversary. In the design
of counter-autonomous systems, this facilitates taking
effective measures against such actions.
2) Covariance Bounds in Localization: Localization refers
to estimating the underlying state x when the transition
kernel is identity; so state x is a random variable. We
consider the case where both us and the adversary do not
know x. For the Gaussian case, we consider a sequential
game setting involving us and the adversary estimating
the underlying state. We show that the asymptotic co-
variance is twice as large as that of classical localization.
3) Parameter Estimation: How to remotely calibrate the
adversary’s sensor? Assume P,G are known and B is
parametrized by vector θ. Compute the maximum likeli-
hood estimate (MLE) of θ given x0:N , a1:N for fixed data
length N . From a practical point of view, this determines
the accuracy of the adversary’s sensor.
4) Optimal Probing. The transition kernel P determines our
random signal x which “probes” the adversary’s sensor.
What choice of P yields the smallest variance in our
estimate of the adversary’s likelihood B?
C. Examples
1. Calibrating a Radar. Here “us” refers to a drone/UAV or
electromagnetic signal that probes an adversary’s sophisticated
multi-function radar system. The adversary’s radar records
measurements yk of the drones kinematic state xk and its
Bayesian tracking functionality computes pik. The radar re-
source manager then chooses an action uk (e.g. waveform,
beam orientation/aperture) and our inference/measurement of
this action is ak. The above problems then boil down to:
estimating the adversary’s tracked estimate so as to predict
its future actions (inverse filtering); determining the accuracy
of the adversary’s radar system (parameter estimation), opti-
mizing the drone’s trajectory to estimate B accurately (optimal
probing).
2. Electronic Warfare. Suppose xk is our electromagnetic
signal applied to jam the adversary’s radar (e.g. a cross po-
larized signal where the phase evolves according to a Markov
process). The radar responds with various actions. Our aim is
to determine the effectiveness of the jamming signal; B models
the likelihood of the radar recognizing the jamming signal, pik
denotes the radar’s belief of whether it is being jammed; and
ak denotes the action we observe from the radar.
3. Interactive Learning. Although we do not pursue it
here, the above model has strong parallels with those used
in personalized education and interactive learning: xk denotes
the quality/difficulty of material being taught; B models how
the learner absorbs the material; pik models the learner’s
knowledge of the material and ak is the response to an
exam administered by the instructor. The instructor aims to
estimate the learner’s knowledge and the learner’s absorption
probabilities to optimize how to present the material.
Simplifications: This paper makes several simplifying as-
sumptions. First, we assume the adversary knows our transition
kernel P to compute the Bayesian belief using (2). In reality
the adversary needs to estimate P based on our trajectory; and
we need to estimate the adversary’s estimate of P . Second, we
assume that the adversary’s sensors are not reactive - that is,
it does not know that we are probing it. If the adversary is a
reactive low probability of intercept (LPI) radar, it will attempt
to confuse our estimator resulting in a dynamical game. Both
these simplifying assumptions point to a more general game-
theoretic setting; which is the subject of future work.
D. Related Works
Counter unmanned autonomous systems are discussed in
[2]. Specifically, [2, Figure 1] places such systems at a level
of abstraction above the physical sensors/actuators/weapons
and datalink layers; and below the human controller layer.
This paper extends our recent works [3], [4], [5] where
the mapping from belief pi to action a was assumed de-
terministic. Specifically, [3] gives a deterministic regression
based approach to estimate the adversary’s model parameters
in a Hidden Markov model. In comparison, the current paper
assumes a probabilistic map between pi and a and develops
Bayesian filtering algorithms for estimating the posterior along
with MLE algorithms for θ. There strong parallels between
inverse filtering and Bayesian social learning [6] as described
in Sec.II-D; the key difference is that in social learning the
aim is to estimate the underlying state given noisy posteriors,
whereas our aim is to estimate the posterior given noisy
posteriors and the underlying state.
II. OPTIMAL INVERSE FILTER FOR ESTIMATING BELIEF
Given the model (1) we now derive a filtering recursion for
the posterior of the adversary’s belief given knowledge of our
state sequence and recorded actions. Accordingly, define
αk(pik) = p(pik|a1:k, x0:k).
3Note that the posterior αk(·) is a random measure since it is a
posterior distribution of the adversary’s posterior distribution
(belief) pik.
Theorem 1. The posterior αk satisfies the following filtering
recursion initialized by prior random measure α0 = p(pi0):
αk+1(pi) =
Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bxk+1,ypik,pi αk(pik)dpik∫
Π
Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bxk+1,ypik,pi αk(pik)dpik dpi
(3)
Here ypik,pi is the observation such that pi = T (pik, y) where
T is the adversary’s filter (2). The conditional mean estimate
of the belief is E{pik+1|a1:k, x0:k} =
∫
Π
piαk+1(pi)dpi. 
Proof. Start with the un-normalized density:
p(pik+1, yk+1, a1:k+1, x0:k+1) = p(ak+1|pik+1) p(yk+1|xk+1)
× p(xk+1|xk)
∫
Π
p(pik+1|yk+1, pik) p(pik, a1:k, x0:k) dpik
Note that p(pik+1|yk+1, pik) = I(pik+1 − T (pik, yk+1)) where
I(·) denotes the indicator function. Finally, marginalizing the
above by integrating over yk+1 and then normalizing yields
(3). The p(xk+1|xk) term cancels out after normalization.
We call (3) the optimal inverse filter since it yields the
Bayesian posterior of the adversary’s belief given our state
and noisy measurements of the adversary’s actions. At first
sight, it appears that αk+1 does not depend on the transition
kernel P . Actually αk+1 does depend on P since from (2),
ypik,pik+1 depends on P .
The rest of this section considers inverse filtering algorithms
for evaluating αk(pi) for the following 5 cases:
1) Inverse Hidden Markov filter (finite dimensional but
exponential computational cost in time)
2) Inverse Kalman filter (finite dimensional sequence of
Kalman filters)
3) Sequential MCMC for inverse filtering; the structure fa-
ciliates using the so called “optimal importance” function.
4) Inverse filtering in multi-agent social learning
5) Inverse Bayesian localization involving conjugate priors
(Gaussian likelihood and Gamma prior)
A. Inverse Hidden Markov Model (HMM) Filter
We first illustrate the inverse filter (3) for the case where the
adversary deploys a HMM filter. Suppose X = {1, 2, . . . , X},
Y = {1, . . . , Y }, A = {1, . . . , A}, implying that our state
{xk, k ≥ 0} is a finite state Markov chain with transition ma-
trix P and the adversary has finite valued HMM observations
{yk, k ≥ 0} with observation probability B. Then T (pi, y)
in (2) is the classical HMM filter and the belief space Π is
the unit X − 1 dimensional simplex, i.e., the space of X-
dimensional probability vectors. Suppose (3) is initialized with
α0(pi) = δ(pi − pi0), i.e., the prior is a Dirac-delta function
placed at pi0 ∈ Π.
For k = 1, 2, . . . construct the finite sets Πk of belief states
via the following recursion:
Πk =
{
T (pi, y), y ∈ Y, pi ∈ Πk−1
}
, Π0 = {pi0}.
Note Πk has Y k elements.
Using (3), the inverse HMM filter for estimating the belief
reads: for pi ∈ Πk+1, the posterior and conditional mean are
αk+1(pi) =
Gpi,ak+1
∑
p¯i∈Πk Bxk+1,yp¯i,pi αk(p¯i)∑
pi∈Πk+1 Gpi,ak+1
∑
p¯i∈Πk Bxk+1,yp¯i,pi αk(p¯i)
E{pik+1|a1:k+1, x0:k+1} =
∑
pi∈Πk+1
piαk+1(pi) (4)
The inverse HMM filter (4) is a finite dimensional recursion,
but the cardinality of Πk grows exponentially with k.
B. Inverse Kalman Filter
We consider a second special case of (3) where the inverse
filtering problem admits a finite dimensional characterization
in terms of the Kalman filter. Consider a linear Gaussian state
space model
xk+1 = Axk + wk, x0 ∼ pi0
yk = C xk + vk
(5)
where xk ∈ X = IRX is “our” state with initial density
pi0 ∼ N(xˆ0,Σ0), yk ∈ Y = IRY denotes the adversary’s
observations, wk ∼ N(0, Qk), vk ∼ N(0, Rk) and {wk},
{vk} are mutually independent i.i.d. processes.
Based on observations y1:k, the adversary computes the
belief pik = N(xˆk,Σk) where xˆk is the conditional mean state
estimate and Σk is the covariance; these are computed via the
classical Kalman filter equations:2
Σk+1|k = AΣkA′ +Q
Kk+1 = CΣk+1|kC ′ +R
xˆk+1 = A xˆk + Σk+1|kC ′K
−1
k+1(yk+1 − C A xˆk)
Σk+1 = Σk+1|k − Σk+1|kC ′K−1k+1CΣk+1|k
(8)
The adversary then chooses its action as a¯k = φ(Σk) xˆk for
some pre-specified function3 φ. We measure the adversary’s
action as
ak = φ(Σk) xˆk + k, k ∼ iid N(0, σ2 ) (9)
The Kalman covariance Σk is deterministic and fully de-
termined by the model parameters. So to estimate the belief
pik = N(xˆk,Σk) we only need to estimate xˆk at each time k
given a1:k, x0:k. Substituting (5) for yk+1 in (8), we see that
(8), (9) constitute a linear Gaussian system with un-observed
state xˆk, observations ak, and known exogenous input xk:
xˆk+1 = (I − ψk+1C)Axˆk + ψk+1vk+1 + ψk+1Cxk+1
ak = φ(Σk) xˆk + k, k ∼ iid N(0, σ2 )
where ψk+1 = Σk+1|kC ′K
−1
k+1
(10)
2For localization problems, we will use the information filter form:
Σ−1k+1 = Σ
−1
k+1|k + C
′R−1C, ψk+1 = Σk+1C′R−1 (6)
Similarly, the inverse Kalman filter in information form reads
Σ¯−1k+1 = Σ¯
−1
k+1|k + C¯
′
k+1R¯
−1C¯k+1, ψ¯k+1 = Σ¯k+1C¯′k+1R¯
−1. (7)
3This choice is motivated by linear quadratic Gaussian control where the
action (control) is chosen as a linear function of the estimated state xˆk
weighed by the covariance matrix
4ψk+1 is called the Kalman gain.
To summarize, our filtered estimate of the adversary’s
filtered estimate xˆk given measurements a1:k, x0:k is achieved
by running “our” Kalman filter on the linear Gaussian state
space model (10), where xˆk, ψk,Σk in (10) are generated by
the adversary’s Kalman filter. Therefore, our Kalman filter uses
the parameters
A¯k = (I − ψk+1C)A, F¯k = ψk+1C, C¯k = φ(Σk),
Q¯k = ψk+1 ψ
′
k+1, R¯ = σ
2

(11)
The equations of our inverse Kalman filter are:
Σ¯k+1|k = A¯kΣ¯kA¯′k + Q¯k
K¯k+1 = C¯k+1Σ¯k+1|kC¯ ′k+1 + R¯
ˆˆxk+1 = A¯k ˆˆxk + Σ¯k+1|kC¯ ′k+1K¯
−1
k+1
×[ak+1 − C¯k+1 (A¯kxˆk + F¯kxk+1) ]
Σ¯k+1 = Σ¯k+1|k − Σ¯k+1|kC¯ ′k+1K¯−1k+1C¯k+1Σ¯k+1|k
(12)
Note ˆˆxk and Σ¯k denote our conditional mean estimate and
covariance of the adversary’s conditional mean xˆk.
C. Particle Filter for Inverse Filtering
In general the optimal inverse filter (3) does not have a
finite dimensional statistic. Also, the inverse HMM filter (4)
is intractable for large data lengths. One needs to resort to an
approximation such as sequential MCMC. Here we describe a
particle filter that uses the optimal importance function (i.e.,
minimizes the variance of the importance weights). Due to
the different dependency structure compared to classical state
space models (see Figure 1), the updates for the importance
weights given below are different compared to classical parti-
cle filters.
The particle filter constructs the N -point Dirac delta func-
tion approximation to the posterior as:4
p(pi0:k, y1:k|x0:k, a1:k) ≈
N∑
i=1
w
(i)
k (pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k)∑N
j=1 w
(i)
k (pi
(j)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k)
δ(pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k)
In complete analogy to the classical particle filter, we con-
struct the sequential importance sampling update as follows:
p(pi0:k, y1:k|x0:k, a1:k) ∝ p(ak|pik) p(pik|pik−1, yk) p(yk|xk)
× p(xk|xk−1) p(pi0:k−1, y1:k−1|x0:k−1, a1:k−1) (13)
The importance density q(·) is chosen such that
q(pi0:k, y1:k|x0:k, a1:k) = q(pi0:k−1, y1:k−1|x0:k−1, a1:k−1)
× q(pik, yk|pi0:k−1, y0:k−1, x0:k, a1:k) (14)
Then defining the importance weights
w
(i)
k (pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k) =
p(pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k|x0:k, a1:k)
q(pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k|x0:k, a1:k)
4We assume here that the adversary computes the belief pi exactly. Of
course, in reality, the adversary itself would use a sub-optimal approximation
to the optimal filter.
(13), (14) yield the following time recursion:
w
(i)
k (pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k) ∝ w(i)k−1(pi(i)0:k−1, y(i)1:k−1)
×
G
pi
(i)
k ,ak
δ(pi
(i)
k − T (pi(i)k−1, y(i)k ))Bxk,y(i)k Pxk−1,xk
q(pi
(i)
k , y
(i)
k |pi(i)0:k−1, y(i)0:k−1, x0:k, a1:k)
(15)
In particle filtering, it recommended to use the so called
“optimal” importance density [7], [8], namely, q∗ =
p(pik, yk|pik−1, yk−1, xk, ak). Note that in our case q∗ =
p(pik|pik−1, yk) p(yk|xk, ak) = δ
(
pik − T (pik−1, yk)
)
p(yk|xk)
is straightforward to sample from. Also using q∗, the impor-
tance weight update (15) becomes
w
(i)
k (pi
(i)
0:k, y
(i)
1:k) ∝ w(i)k−1(pi(i)0:k−1, y(i)1:k−1)Gpik,akPxk−1,xk
(16)
In summary, the particle filtering algorithm becomes:
Sequential Importance Sampling step: At each time k
• For i = 1, . . . , N sample from importance density q or q∗
(p˜i
(i)
k , y˜
(i)
k ) ∼ q(p˜ik, yk|pi(i)0:k−1, y(i)1:k−1, x0:k, a1:k)
Set (p˜i(i)0:k, y
(i)
1:k) = (pi
(i)
0:k−1, p˜i
(i)
k , y
(i)
1:k−1, y˜
(i)
k ).
• Update importance weights w(i)k using (15) or (16).
Resampling/Selection step: Multiply/Discard particles with
high/low normalised importance weights to obtain N new
particles with unit weight.
Finally, the particle filter estimate of the posterior pik at each
time k is E{pik|a1:k, x0:k} ≈
∑N
i=1 w
(i)
k pi
(i)
k /
∑N
i=1 w
(i)
k .
To summarize, the particle filter provides a tractable sub-
optimal algorithm for inverse filtering and it is straightforward
to sample from the optimal importance density.
D. Inverse Filtering for Multiagent Social Learning Models
Thus far we have considered inverse filtering based on the
graphical model in Figure 1. Below, motivated by Bayesian
social learning models in behavioral economics and sociol-
ogy (which is also now popular in signal processing), we
consider inverse filtering for the graphical model depicted in
Figure 2. The adversary now is a multi-agent system that
aims to estimate the state of “our” underlying Markov state
xk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}. The key difference compared to Figure 1
is that in Figure 2 the previous action taken by the adversary
directly affects the dynamics of the belief update. Such social
learning is motivated by multi-agent decision making in social
groups/networks and can result in spectacular behavior such
as cascades and herding; see [9] for an extensive signal
processing centric discussion.
1) Social Learning Protocol: We start by describing the
classic Bayesian social learning protocol. In social learning,
the multiagent adversary learns (estimates) our state based on
their observations of the state and actions taken by previous
agents. Each agent takes an action uk once in a predetermined
sequential order indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . The index k can also
be viewed as the time instant when agent k acts. Assume at the
beginning of iteration k, all agents have access to the public
belief pik−1 defined in Step (iv) below.
5x0 x1 x2 x3
y1 y2 y3
pi1pi0 pi2 pi3
u1 u2 u3
a1 a2 a3
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of social learning filtering problem. The
shaded nodes are known to us, while the white nodes are unknown
The social learning protocol proceeds as follows [10], [6]:
(i) Private Observation: At time k, agent k records a private
observation yk ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y } from the observation
distribution Biy = P (yk = y|xk = i), i ∈ X .
(ii) Private Belief: Using the public belief pik−1 available
at time k − 1 (Step (iv) below), agent k updates its private
posterior belief ηk(i) = P(xk = i|u1, . . . , uk−1, yk) using the
classical Bayesian filter (2) which reads:
ηk =
BykP
′ pi
1′Bypi
, Byk = diag(P (yk|xk = i), i ∈ X ). (17)
Here ηk is an X-dimensional probability mass function (pmf).
(iii) Myopic Action: Agent k takes action
uk ∈ A = {1, 2, . . . , A}
to minimize its expected cost
uk = arg min
u∈A
E{c(xk, u)|u1:k−1, yk} = arg min
u∈A
{c′uηk}.
(18)
Here cu = (c(i, u), i ∈ X ) denotes an X dimensional
cost vector, and c(i, u) denotes the cost incurred when the
underlying state is i and the agent chooses action u.
(iv) Social Learning Filter: Given the action uk of agent k, and
the public belief pik−1, each subsequent agent k′ > k performs
social learning to update the public belief pik according5 to the
“social learning filter”:
pik = T (pik−1, uk), where T (pi, u) =
Rpiu P
′ pi
σ(pi, u)
(19)
where σ(pi, u) = 1′RpiuP
′pi is the normalization factor of the
Bayesian update. In (19), the public belief pik(i) = P (xk =
5For the reader unfamiliar with social learning, the remarkable aspect of
the social learning filter is that the likelihood Rpiu is an explicit function of the
prior pi; whereas in classical filtering the prior and likelihood are functionally
independent. This dependence of the likelihood on the prior that causes social
learning to have unusual behavior such as herding and information cascades.
i|u1, . . . uk) and Rpiu = diag(P(u|x = i, pi), i ∈ X ) has
elements
P (uk = u|xk = i, pik−1 = pi) =
∑
y∈Y
P(u|y, pi)P(y|xk = i)
P (uk = u|y, pi) =
{
1 if c′uByP
′pi ≤ c′u˜By P ′ pi, u˜ ∈ A
0 otherwise.
where I(·) is the indicator function and By are the classical
observation likelihoods is defined in (17).
2) Inverse Social Learning Filter: Given the above classical
Bayesian social learning model, our aim is to estimate the
public belief pik given the state sequence x0:k and noisy
measurements a1:k of the agents actions u1:k.
In order to proceed, first note that, as shown [11], the social
learning filter (19) has the following property: The belief space
Π can be partitioned into A (possibly empty) subsets denoted
Π1, . . . ,ΠA such that the prior dependent likelihood Rpia in
(19) is a peiecewise constant function of prior belief pi. i.e.,
Rpiu = R
l
u, pi ∈ Πl, l ∈ {1, . . . , A}.
In complete analogy to Sec.II-A, we can now construct the
inverse social learning filter: Let Gu,a = P(a|u).
For k = 1, 2, . . . construct Πk via the following recursion:
Πk =
{
T (pi, u), u ∈ A, pi ∈ Πk−1
}
, Π0 = {pi0}.
Note Πk has Ak elements. The inverse social learning filter
computes the posterior α(pi) and conditional mean of belief
pi ∈ Πk+1 as follows:
αk+1(pi) =
Gu∗,ak+1
∑
p¯i∈Πk Bxk+1,yp¯i,pi,u∗ αk(p¯i)∑
pi∈Πk+1 Gu∗,ak+1
∑
p¯i∈Πk Bxk+1,yp¯i,pi,u∗ αk(p¯i)
E{pik+1|a1:k+1, x0:k+1} =
∑
pi∈Πk+1
piαk+1(pi) (20)
Here u∗(p¯i, pi) is the action such that pi = T (p¯i, u). Also,
y(p¯i, pi, u) is the observation such that (18) holds.
E. Inverse Bayesian Localization using Conjugate Priors
We conclude this section by discussing a two-time scale
inverse Bayesian localization problem. Recall that localization
refers to the case where our state is a random variable x0
instead of a random process.
1) Model: Assume our state is a finite valued; so x0 ∈
{1, 2, . . . , X} is a random variable with prior pi0. (The transi-
tion kernel P = I). The adversary aims to localize (estimate)
our state based on noisy measurements that are exponentially
distributed (this models the received radar signal power)
yk ∼ Bx0,y = λx0 exp(−λx0y), k = 1, 2, . . . (21)
In (21), λ0
defn
= λx0 denotes the power gain parameter at the
receiver when the true state is x0. Note that k indexes the slow
time scale. The measurements yk are obtained by integrating
the received power over a fast time scale defined below.
The adversary computes belief pik using the Bayesian filter
(2) with P = I and observation kernel Bx,y with parameter
λ = (λ1, . . . , λX)
′. Let p¯ik(i) = p(x, y1:k) denote the un-
normalized posterior density at time k. Since Bxy is an
6exponential density, each element log p¯ik(i), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}
evolves with linear dynamics:
log p¯ik+1(i) = log λi + log p¯ik(i)− λiyk+1. (22)
Equivalently, relative to some fixed location 1, defining
∆k(i) = log p¯ik(i)−log p¯ik(1), the dynamics of the adversary’s
belief update are given by the linear stochastic system
∆k+1(i) = ∆k(i) + log
λi
λ1
− (λi − λ1)yk+1 (23)
Let t = 1, . . . , T denote the fast time scale at each epoch k.
We assume that our measurement of the adversary’s radiated
power in units of decibels (relative to location 1) at fast time
scale (t, k) in each location i ∈ {2, . . . , X} is
at,k(i) = µi +
vt,k(i)√|∆k(i)| (24)
where µi is the path loss and vt,k(i) is zero mean unit variance
iid Gaussian. Equivalently the absolute power is proportional
to exp(µi) zt,k(i) where zt,k(i) = (pik(1)/pik(i))vt,k(i) is log-
normal distributed. The intuition behind (24) is as follows:
Since the adversary’s radar radiates energy to location i
proportional to pik(i), so our variance of the measurement
noise is inversely proportional to pik(i). Hence the scaling of
the noise variance by 1/∆k(i) in (24) in log-scale.
2) Inverse Localization: The aim is to estimate adversary’s
belief ∆k given a1:T,k, i.e., compute p(∆k|a1:T,k) given x0.
Recall a1:T,k = (a1,k, . . . , aT,k). From (22)
∆k(i) = k log
λi
λ1
+ ∆0(i)− (λi − λ1)
k∑
n=1
yn
Denote Sk =
∑k
n=1 yn. Since {yn} are iid exponential
distributed, hence Sk has a Gamma distribution with pdf
pSk(s) = Ga(k, λ0) = λ0 e
−λ0s (λ0s)
k−1
(k − 1)! , s ≥ 0
The Gaussian likelihood (24) with Gamma prior for the
precision (inverse of variance) form a Bayesian conjugate
pair; implying that the posterior is also a Gamma distribution.
Therefore, we have the following Bayesian estimator of the
adversary’s relative belief ∆k:
Theorem 2. For the model (21), (22), (24), our posterior of
the adversary’s belief given a1:T,k, x0 has a Gamma density:
p(log ∆k(i) = s|a1:T,k, x0) = 1
λi − λ1 pSk|a1:T,k
(
bi − s
λi − λ1
)
where s ≥ 0, bi = k log λi/λ1 + log ∆0(i) and
pSk|a1:T,k(s|a1:T,k) = Ga
(
k+
T
2
, λ0 +
1
2
( T∑
t=1
at,k(i)−µi
)2)

III. SEQUENTIAL LOCALIZATION GAME: COVARIANCE
BOUNDS
Suppose our state x0 is a random variable and the adversary
localizes our state via a Bayesian estimator. We observe the
adversary’s actions and estimate the adversary’s belief. Since
the adversary’s belief pik converges to a Dirac mass centered
on our state x0 with probability one (under suitable regularity
conditions6), our posterior αk(pi) computed via the inverse
filter, will also converge with probability one to a Dirac mass
centered on x0. The question we address in this section is: How
much slower is the convergence of our inverse filter compared
to the adversary’s Bayesian filter?
To make our analysis illustrative, throughout this section, we
consider a scalar-valued localization problem with the inverse
Kalman filter. Assume x0 ∈ IR (scalar state), A = 1, C =
1, Q = 0, R = 1; so the adversary observes us with SNR
1. Assume the adversary’s prior is non-informative; so xˆ0 =
0X ,Σ0 =∞.
A. Localization and Inverse Kalman Filter
We start with an elementary but useful observation. Using
the information filter (6), it readily follows that the adversary’s
localization estimate is
xˆk+1 =
1
k + 1
k+1∑
n=1
yn, Σk+1 =
1
k + 1
Supose we observe the adversary’s action with SNRk =
C¯2k/R¯k and initial condition Σ¯0 = ∞. Then the covariance
of our estimate (using inverse Kalman filter (10)) of the
adversary’s belief evolves as
Σ¯k+1 =
k2Σ¯k + 1
(k + 1)2 + SNRk+1 (k2Σ¯k + 1)
(25)
From (25), it is easily seen that
Σ¯k|SNR=1 < Σ¯k|SNR=Σk < Σk
i.e., our covariance of the adversary’s state estimate is strictly
smaller than the adversary’s covariance of our state.
B. Sequential Localization Game in Adversarial Setting
Thus far we assumed that x0 is known to us and our aim
was to estimate the adversary’s estimate. In this section, our
framework is different in two ways. First, we assume that
neither us nor the adversary know the underlying state x0. For
example, x0 could denote the threat level of an autonomous
unidentified drone hovering relative to a specific location.
Second, there is feedback; the adversary’s action affects our
estimate and our action affects the adversary’s estimate.
The setup is naturally formulated in game-theoretic terms.
The adversary and us play a sequential game to localize
(estimate) x0:
1) At odd time instants k = 1, 3, . . ., the adversary takes
active measurements of the target and makes decisions
based on its estimate. We use measurements of the
6The Bernstein von-Mises theorem [12] yields a central limit theorem for
the Bayesian estimator and therefore the asymptotic convergence rate.
7adversary’s decisions to localize the target. The details
are as follows: The adversary has a noisy measurement
ak−1 = uk−1 + k−1 where uk−1 = xˆk−1 is our action.
The adversary assumes that our state estimate is ak−1 and
its Kalman filter (8) then yields the updated state estimate
xˆk = (1− ψk)ak−1 + ψkyk, where ψk = Σk.
The adversary then takes action uk = xˆk to myopically
minimize the mean square error of the estimate. We
eavesdrop (observe) the adversary’s action in noise as
ak = xˆk + k. Assume k ∼ N(0, σ2 ) iid. So
ak = (1− ψk)ak−1 + ψkvk + ψkx0 + k
Since ak−1 = uk−1 + k−1, our effective observation
equation of x0 based on our measurement of the adver-
sary’s action ak is
zk
defn
=
ak
ψk
− 1− ψk
ψk
uk−1 =
1− ψk
ψk
k−1 +vk+
k
ψk
+x0
(26)
We know all the quantities in the middle equation; uk−1
was our action taken at time k − 1, and ak is our
measurement of the adversary’s action at time k.
To summarize, at odd time instants, zk = 1−ψkψk k−1 +
vk+
k
ψk
+x0 is our effective observation of the unknown
state x0 purely based on sensing the adversary’s actions.
2) At even time instants k = 2, 4, . . . , we take active
measurements of the target and take actions based on
our estimates. The adversary uses measurements of our
actions to localize the target. We use our measurement
ak−1 of the adversary’s action, obtain a noisy observation
yk of x0 and then compute belief pik. We then take action
uk to myopically minimize the mean square error of
the estimate. The adversary eavesdrops on (observes) our
action in noise as ak.
The above setup constitutes a social learning sequential game
[13]. Since the decisions are made myopically each time (to
minimize the mean square error), the strategy profile at each
time constitutes a Nash equlibrium. More importantly [13,
Theorem 5], the asymptotic behavior (in time) is captured by
a social learning equlibrium (SLE).
Theorem 3. Consider the sequential game formulation for
localizing the random variable state x0. Then for large k,
the covariance of our estimate of the state x0 is Σk = 2k−1
(which is twice the covariance for classical localization). The
same result holds for the adversary’s estimate. 
Remark. Theorem 3 has two interesting consequences.
1) The asymptotic covariance is independent of σ2 (i.e. SNR
of our observation of the adversary’s action) as long as
σ2 > 0. If σ
2
 = 0, there is a phase change and the
covariance Σk = k−1 as in the standard Kalman filter.
2) In the special case where only (26) is observed at each
time (and the k−1 term is omitted), the formulation
reduces to the Bayesian social learning problem of [6,
Chapter 3]. In that case, [6, Proposition 3.1] shows that
Σk = O(k
−1/3).
To summarize, Theorem 3 confirms the intuition that sequen-
tially learning the state indirectly from the adversary’s actions
(and the adversary learning the state from our actions) slows
down the convergence of the localization estimator.
IV. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD PARAMETER ESTIMATION OF
ADVERSARY’S SENSOR
So far we have discussed Bayesian estimation of the ad-
versary’s belief state. In comparison, this section considers
parameter estimation. Our aim is to estimate the adversary’s
observation kernel B in (1) which quantifies the accuracy of
the adversary’s sensors. We assume that B is parametrized
by an M -dimensional vector θ ∈ Θ where Θ is a compact
subset of IRM . Denote the parametrized observation kernel as
Bθ. Assume that both us and the adversary know P (state
transition kernel7) and G (probabilistic map from adversary’s
belief to its action). Then given our state sequence x0:N and
adversary’s action sequence a1:N , our aim is to compute the
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ. That is, with L(θ)
denoting the log likelihood, compute
θ∗ = arg max
θ∈Θ
L(θ), L(θ) = log p(x0:N , a1:N |θ).
A. General Purpose Optimization for MLE
The likelihood can be evaluated from the un-normalized
version of the inverse filtering recursion (3) which reads
qθk+1(pi) = Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bθxk+1,yθpik,pi
qθk(pik)dpik (27)
Given the un-normalized filtering recursion (27), the log
likelihood is the normalization term at time N :
L(θ) = log
∫
Π
qθN (pi)dpi. (28)
Given (28), the MLE can be computed using a general
purpose numerical optimization algorithm such as fmincon
in Matlab. This uses the interior reflective Newton method [14]
for large scale problems and sequential quadratic programming
[15] for medium scale problems. In general L(θ) is non-
concave in θ and the constraint set Θ is non-convex. So the
algorithm at best will converge to a local stationary point
of the likelihood function. General purpose optimizers such
as fmincon in Matlab allow for the gradient ∇θL(θ) and
Hessian ∇2θL(θ) of the likelihood as inputs to the algorithm.
These are typically computed via the so called sensitivity equa-
tions. For the general inverse filtering problem, the sensitivity
equations are formidable.
Remark. EM Algorithm: The Expectation Maximization
(EM) algorithm is a popular numerical algorithm for comput-
ing the MLE especially when the Maximization (M) step can
be computed in closed form. It is widely used for computing
the MLE of the parameters of a linear Gaussian state space
model [16], [17]. Unfortunately, for estimating the adversary’s
observation model, due to the time evolving dynamics in (11),
the EM algorithm is not useful since the M-step involves a
non-convex optimization that cannot be done in closed form.
There is no obvious way of choosing the latent variables to
avoid this non-convexity.
7As mentioned earlier, otherwise the adversary estimates P as Pˆ and we
need to estimate the adversary’s estimate as ˆˆP . This makes the estimation
task substantially more complex.
8B. Estimating Adversary’s Gain Matrix in Linear Gaussian
Case
Consider the setup in Sec.II-B where our dynamics are
linear Gaussian and the adversary observes our state linearly
in Gaussian noise (5). The adversary estimates our state using
a Kalman filter, and we estimate the adversary’s estimate using
the inverse Kalman filter (10). Using (28), (10), (11), the log
likelihood for the adversary’s observation gain matrix θ = C
based on our measurements is
L(θ) = const− 1
2
N∑
k=1
log |K¯θk | −
1
2
N∑
k=1
ι′k (K¯
θ
k)
−1 ιk
ιk = ak − C¯θk A¯θk−1 ˆˆxk−1 − F¯ θk−1xk−1 (29)
where ιk are the innovations of the inverse Kalman filter (12).
In (29), our state xk−1 is known to us and therefore is a
known exogenous input. Also note from (11) that A¯k, F¯k are
explicit functions of C, while C¯k and Q¯k depend on C via
the adversary’s Kalman filter.
The following known result summarizes the consistency of
the MLE for the for the adversary’s gain matrix C in the linear
Gaussian case.
Theorem 4. Assume that A is stable, and the state space
model (5) is an identifiable minimal realization (which im-
plies controllability and observability). Then the adversary’s
Kalman filter variables Kk, ψk,Σk converge to steady state
values geometrically fast in k [18] implying that asymptoti-
cally the system (10) is stable linear time invariant. Also, the
MLE θ∗ (maximizer for (29)) for the adversary’s observation
matrix C using (10) is unique and a strongly consistent
estimator [19]. 
Numerical Examples. To provide insight, Figure 3 displays
the log-likelihood versus adversary’s gain matrix C using (29)
in the scalar case. The parameters in the simulation are A =
0.4, Q = 2, R = 1, σ2 = 1 in (9) with N = 1000. The four
sub-figures correspond to true values of Co = 0.5, 1, 5, 2, 3
respectively.
Each sub-figure in Figure 3 has two plots. The plot in
red is the log-likelihood of C ∈ (0, 10] evaluated based on
the adversary’s observations using the standard Kalman filter.
(This is the classical log-likelihood of the observation gain
of a Gaussian state space model.) The plot in blue is the
log-likelihood of C ∈ (0, 10] computed using (29) based on
our measurements of the adversary’s action using the inverse
Kalman filter (where the adversary first estimates our state
using a Kalman filter) - we call this the inverse case.
Figure 3 shows that the log likelihood in the inverse case
(blue plots) has a less pronounced maximum compared to
the standard case (red plots). This implies that numerical
algorithms for computing the MLE of the enemy’s gain using
our observations of the adversary’s actions (via the inverse
Kalman filter) will converge much more slowly than the
classical MLE (which uses the adversary’s observations). This
is intuitive - our estimate of the adversary’s parameter is based
on the adversary’s estimate of our state - so there is more noise
to contend with.
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Fig. 3. Log-Likelihood as a function of enemy’s gain C ∈ (0, 10] when
true value is Co. The red curves denote the log-likelihood of C given the
enemy’s measurements. The blue curves denotes the log-likelihood of C using
the inverse Kalman filter given our observations of the enemy’s action. The
plots show that it is more difficult to compute the MLE for the inverse filtering
problem due to the almost flat likelihood (blue curves) compared to red curves.
9Co Classic Inverse
0.5 0.24× 10−3 5.3× 10−3
1.5 1.2× 10−3 37× 10−3
2 2.1× 10−3 70× 10−3
3 4.6× 10−3 336× 10−3
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF CRAMER RAO BOUNDS FOR C - CLASSICAL STATE
SPACE MODEL VS INVERSE KALMAN FILTER MODEL
Cramer Rao (CR) bounds. Is it instructive to compare
the CR bounds for MLE of C for the classic model versus
that of the inverse Kalman filters model. Table I displays the
CR bounds (reciprocal of expected Fisher information) for
the four examples considered above evaluated using via the
algorithm in [20]. It shows that the covariance lower bound for
the inverse case is substantially higher than that for the classic
case. This is again consistent with the intuition that estimating
the adversary’s parameter based on its actions (which is based
on its estimate of us) is more difficult than directly estimating
C in a classical state space model.
V. OPTIMAL PROBING OF ADVERSARY
Thus far we have discussed estimating the adversary’s belief
state and observation matrix. This section deals with optimal
probing also known as input design. Suppose our probe signal
xk is a finite state Markov chain with transition matrix P .
Recall from (1) that the adversary observes xk via observation
probabilities B and deploys a Bayesian filter (involving P,B)
to compute its belief pik, then chooses action uk that we
observe as ak. This section addresses the question: How should
we choose the transition matrix P of our probe signal xk to
minimize the covariance of our estimate of the adversary’s
observation kernel B?
Below we consider two approaches. The first approach is
analytical – using stochastic dominance, we establish a partial
ordering amongst probe transition matrices which results in a
corresponding ordering of our SNR of the adversary’s actions.
The second approach is numerical – we describe a stochastic
gradient algorithm to optimize the probe transition matrix.
A. Stochastic Dominance Ordering of Optimal Probing Tran-
sition Matrices
In this subsection, we construct a partial ordering for
transition matrices P of our probe signal xk which results
in a corresponding ordering of our SNR of the adversary’s
action. The result is useful since computing the optimal P
is non-trivial (see next subsection), yet we can compare the
SNRs to two different probing signals without brute force
computations. Note that maximizing this SNR can be viewed
as a surrogate for minimizing the covariance of our estimate
of the adversary’s observation kernel B.
1) Assumptions: We assume (these assumptions are dis-
cussed below)
(A1) P is totally positive of order 2, see [21], [1]. That is
every second order minor of P is non-negative.
(A2) The adversary chooses action uk = φ(g′pik) where g is
a vector with increasing elements and φ is any increasing
non-negative function (e.g. quantizer). Recall the adver-
sary observes xk as yk and computes its Bayesian belief
pik via (2) using the transition matrix P .
Given our observation ak = uk+k of the adversary’s action
uk, define the signal to noise ratio
SNR(P ) =
E{u2k}
σ2
.
2) Copositive Dominance and Monotone Likelihood Ra-
tio Dominance: In order to compare SNR(P ) for different
probing transition matrices P , we introduce two definitions:
copositive dominance of transition matrices and monotone
likelihood ratio dominance of beliefs.
Copositivity generalizes positive semi-definiteness. Recall a
matrix L is positive semi-definite if pi′Lpi ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ IRX .
In comparison, a matrix L is copositive if pi′Lpi ≥ 0 for all
X-dimensional probability vectors pi.
Given two transition matrices P (1) and P (2), define the
matrices Lj , j = 1, . . . X − 1 each of dimension X ×X as
Lj =
1
2
[
γjmn + γ
j
nm
]
X×X ,
γjmn = Pm,j(1)Pn,j+1(2)− Pm,j+1(1)Pn,j(2).
(30)
Definition 5 (Copositive Ordering of Transition Matrices [1]).
Given two transition matrices P (1) and P (2), we say that
P (1) is copositively dominated by P (2), denoted as P (1) 
P (2) if each matrix Lj,a, j = 1 . . . , X − 1 is copositive, i.e.,
pi′Lj,api ≥ 0, ∀pi ∈ Π.
Next we define the monotone likelihood ratio partial order
for probability mass functions.
Definition 6 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) Dominance).
Let pi1, pi2 ∈ Π be any two probability vectors. Then pi1 is
greater than pi2 with respect to the MLR ordering – denoted
as pi1 ≥lr pi2 – if
pi1(i)pi2(j) ≤ pi2(i)pi1(j), i < j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , X}. (31)
Similarly pi1 ≤lr pi2 if ≤ in (31) is replaced by a ≥.
The MLR stochastic order is useful in a Bayesian context since
it is closed under conditional expectations. That is, X ≥lr Y
implies E{X|F} ≥lr E{Y |F} for any two random variables
X,Y and sigma-algebra F [22].
Discussion of Assumptions: (A1) is widely used in Markov
chain structural analysis; see [1] for specific examples and also
the classic paper [21]. (A2) says that larger beliefs (wrt MLR
order) of the adversary correspond to larger actions taken by
the adversary. This implies that u is increasing with our state
x. For example, if x denote the threat levels perceived by the
adversary, then the larger our state, the larger the adversary’s
action.
3) Main Result: With the above definitions, we are now
ready to state the main result of this subsection.
As shown in [1], copositive dominance is a sufficient
condition for the one step Bayesian belief updates (2) using
P (1) and P (2), respectively, to satisfy T (pi, y;P (1)) ≤lr
T (pi, y, P (2)) where ≤lr denotes likelihood ratio dominance.
Assumption (A1) globalizes this assertion and implies that
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adversary’s beliefs for transition matrices P (1) and P (2)
satisfy piP (1)k ≤lr piP (2)k for all time k. This implies that E{u2k}
using P (1) is smaller than that using P (2). We summarize this
argument as the following result.
Theorem 7. Suppose transition matrices P (1), P (2) satisfy
(A1), (A2) and P (1)  P (2) (copositive ordering). Then
1) The belief updates using transition matrices P (1) and
P (2) satisfy: piP (1)k ≤lr piP (2)k for all time k.
2) Therefore, our probe signal {xk} generated with transi-
tion matrix P (1) incurs a smaller signal to noise ratio
compared to probe signal with transition matrix P (2),
that is, SNR(P (1)) ≤ SNR(P (2)).

To put the above theorem in context, note that evaluating
SNR(P ) is non-trivial due to multiple levels of dynamics
and dependencies: P determines our probe signal; then the
adversary observes our probe signal in noise, computes the
posterior (using the Bayesian filter (2) with transition matrix
P ) and then responds with an action uk generated according to
(A2) which we observe in noise. Despite this complexity, the
theorem says that we can impose a partial order on the probe
transition matrices P resulting in a corresponding ordering of
the SNR of our observation of the adversary’s action (which
is a surrogate for the covariance of our estimate of B).
4) Examples: We start with simple 2-state examples of
(A1) and copositive dominance P (1)  P (2) for illustrative
purposes; see [1] for several high dimensional examples:
(i) : P (1) =
[
0.8 0.2
0.7 0.3
]
, P (2) =
[
0.2 0.8
0.1 0.9
]
(ii) : P (1) =
[
1 0
1− p p
]
, P (2) =
[
1 0
1− q q
]
, q > p
For examples (i) and (ii) above, (A1) and copositive domi-
nance holds; so if (A2) also holds then Theorem 7 holds.
We now illustrate Theorem 7 with higher dimensional
examples.
Example 1. Optimizing Probe Signal with Stopping Proba-
bility Constraints. Let state 1 denote the stopping (absorbing
state). The transition matrix of our probe signal is of the form
Pi1(θ) = 1− (X − 1)θi, Pij(θ) = θi, P11(θ) = 1.
where θi ∈ [0, 1/(X − 1)], i = 2, . . . , X so that P (θ) is a
valid stochastic matrix. Then (A1) holds. Also P (θ)  P (θ¯)
for θ < θ¯ elementwise.
If state 1 is viewed as sending no probe signal, then the
probe signal stops (to maintain a low probability of intercept
constraint) at a random time whose expected value is deter-
mined by θi. The larger θi is chosen, the higher the SNR of
the adversary.
Example 2. Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) ordered
probability vectors. Suppose we have L probability vectors
vi each of dimension X that are MLR ordered (see Defn. 6),
i.e. v1 ≤lr v2 · · · ≤lr vL. We need to choose X vectors out of
these L vectors to construct the transition matrix of our probe
signal. Then the optimal probability vectors to choose for the
transition matrix are P (2) =
[
vL−X+1, · · · , vL−1, vL
]′
. It can
be shown that (A1) holds and P (2) copositively dominates
any other transition matrix P (1) constructed from vectors
v1, . . . , vL−X . Thus Theorem 7 implies that P (2) yields the
probe signal with the optimal SNR.
In summary, this subsection presented a partially ordering
for the transition matrices of probe signals which resulted in a
corresponding ordering of SNRs (surrogate for the covariance
of our estimate of the adversary’s sensor gain).
B. Stochastic Gradient Algorithm for Optimizing Probe
The previous subsection presented an analytical framework
for characterizing the probe signals. Here we present a nu-
merical stochastic gradient algorithm to solve the following
stochastic optimization problem: Given our state sequence
x0:N and observations of the adversary’s actions a1:N , find
the transition matrix P ∗ of our probe signal that minimizes
the variance of our estimate of the adversary’s likelihood:
P ∗ = arg min
P
J(P )
defn
= Ex0:N ,a1:N {Var(Bˆ)} (32)
Here Bˆ is our MLE of B given a1:N computed using the meth-
ods in Sec.IV, and Var(Bˆ) denotes the empirical variance.
Note that (32) is a constrained optimization problem since
P needs to be a valid stochastic matrix. We use the following
trick to re-parametize the problem as an unconstrained opti-
mization. We parametrize P using spherical coordinates: Let
θij ∈ IR for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}, j = {1, . . . , X−1} and define
the parametrized transition matrix P (θ) as
Pi1(θ) = cos
2 θi1, PiX(θ) = sin
2 θi,X−1
X−2∏
l=1
sin2 θil
Pij(θ) = cos
2 θij
j−1∏
l=1
sin2 θil, j = 2, . . . , X − 1
(33)
Note that even though θ is unconstrained, is straightforwardly
verified that P (θ) is a valid stochastic matrix.8
The stochastic optimization (32) can be solved using a
stochastic gradient algorithm. The key issue is to estimate the
gradient of the covariance of the MLE B∗ wrt θ. Algorithm
1 uses one possible stochastic gradient algorithm, namely, the
Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA)
algorithm [24] to generate a sequence of estimates θ(I),
I = 1, 2, . . . , that converges to a local stationary point of
the objective J(P ) defined in (32).
The SPSA Algorithm 1 [24] picks a single random direction
dn along which direction the derivative is evaluated at each
batch n. To evaluate the gradient estimate ∇θJ (I) in (34),
SPSA requires only 2 batch simulations, i.e., the number
of evaluations is independent of dimension of parameter θ.
Algorithm 1 converges to a local stationary point optimum of
objective J(P ) (defined in (32)) with probability one. This is a
straightforward application of techniques in [25] (which gives
general convergence methods for Markovian dependencies).
8This approach is based on elementary differential geometry and is
equivalent to constraining the derivative to a manifold that ensures the
stochastic gradient update yields a valid transition matrix [23]. For X = 2,
the parametrization yields
[
cos2 θ11 sin
2 θ11
cos2 θ21 sin
2 θ21
]
which is always a valid
transition matrix. Another possibility is to use logistic functions.
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Algorithm 1 SPSA Algorithm for estimating optimal probe
transition matrix P ∗ parametrized by θ in (33)
Step 1: Choose initial parameter θ(0).
Step 2: For iterations I = 0, 1, 2, . . .
• Simulate system (1) and generate action sequence a(I)1:N =
(a1, . . . , aN )
(I).
• Evaluate sample variance J (I) of MLE of B using a(I)1:N .
• Compute gradient estimate
∇θJ (I) = J
(I)(θ(I) + ∆IdI)− J (I)(θ(I) −∆IdI)
2∆I
dI ,
dI(i) =
{
−1 with probability 0.5
+1 with probability 0.5.
.
Here ∆n = ∆/(n + 1)γ denotes the gradient step size
with 0.5 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and ∆ > 0.
• Update estimate via stochastic gradient algorithm
θ(I+1) = θ(I) − n+1∇θJ (I)(θ(I)),
n = /(n+ 1 + s)
ζ , ζ ∈ (0.5, 1], , s > 0. (34)
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is an early step towards understanding ad-
versarial signal processing problems in counter-autonomous
systems. We presented four main results: First, we formulated
the problem of estimating the adversary’s filtered density
(posterior) given noisy measurements (adversary’s actions),
when the adversary itself runs a Bayesian filter to estimate our
state. Several such inverse filtering algorithms were proposed
for various signal models. Second, we discussed sequential
localization as a game between us and the adversary. The
convergence of the inverse filter is slower compared to the
adversary’s Bayesian filter. An interesting result was the phase
transition in the asymptotic covariance. Third, we discussed
how to compute the maximum likelihood estimate of the
adversary’s observation matrix using the inverse filter. This al-
lows us to calibrate the accuracy of the adversary’s sensors and
therefore estimate the adversary’s sensor capability. Finally,
we discussed how to adapt (control) our state to minimize
the covariance of the estimate of the adversary’s observation
likelihood. “Our” state can be viewed as a probe signal which
causes the adversary to act; so choosing the optimal state
sequence is an input design problem.
Estimating the posterior distribution and sensor gain of
the adversary is a difficult problem. In general identifiability
issues can arise for estimating the adversary’s sensor gain.
Also geometric ergodicity (stability) of the inverse filter, that
is, the inverse filter forgets its initial condition geometrically
fast, is difficult to establish. There are several interesting
extensions that can be considered in future work. One area is
to study the convergence properties of the maximum likelihood
estimate to the CRB for the inverse filtering case, i.e., sample
complexity results for the error variance to converge to the
CRB. Another extension is to estimate the utility function
of the adversary based on its response, using for example,
revealed preferences from microeconomics. Finally, a careful
dynamic game theoretic formulation of counter-autonomous
systems is of interest, where the specific forward and backward
physical channel responses are considered.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Our update dynamics via the Kalman filter are:
• At odd time instants, using effective observation zk (from
the adversary) our state estimate and covariance evolves
as
xˆk = (1− ψ¯k)xˆk−1 + ψ¯kzk
Σ−1k = Σ
−1
k−1 + R¯
−1
k
where ψ¯k =
Σk−1
Σk−1 + R¯k
, ψk = (1 + Σ
−1
k−1)
−1 (35)
R¯k =
(1− ψk)2
ψ2k
σ2 +
σ2
ψ2k
+ 1,
Note: Even though zk has k and k−1, since the update
only happens every two time steps (odd times), they are
statistically independent of k+2 and k+1 in zk+2.
• At even time instants, using our own observation yk,
xˆk = (1− ψk)xˆk−1 + ψkyk, ψk = Σk
Σ−1k = Σ
−1
k−1 + 1
(36)
To analyze the convergence rate, consider the precision matrix
Pk = Σ−1k . The combined covariance update of (35), (36) is
Pk+2 = Pk + 1
+
1
1 + σ2 (2 + Pk)2
[
1 + (1− (Pk + 2)−1)2
] (37)
Thus asymptotically Pk = O(k) and Σk = O(k−1). However,
the initial behavior of the covariance exhibits slower decrease
due to the last term in (37). It is straightforward (but tedious)
to show that for large k, Σk = 2/k.
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Let piP (1)k and pi
P (2)
k , denote the posteriors computed using
Bayesian filter (2) with transition matrices P (1) and P (2)
respectively, initialized with common prior pi0. Under (A1), it
follows from [1, Theorem 10.6.1] that copositive dominance
P (1)  P (2) implies the following sample path likelihood
ratio dominance: piP (1)k ≤lr piP (2)k for all time k where ≤lr de-
notes monotone likelihood ratio dominance. Since likelihood
ratio dominance implies first order stochastic dominance [22],
it follows that under (A2) that g′piP (1)k ≤ g′piP (2)k . From (A2)
φ(·) is non-negative and increasing, and so uP (1)k ≤ uP (2)k
implying E{(uP (1)k )2} ≤ E{(uP (2)k )2}.
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